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IN RE CDT: THE NEED FOR GREATER CLARITY
IN PRIVATE ADOPTION
A mother consented to the adoption of her yet unborn child by the
plaintiffs in an undated act executed before a notary public. She was not
represented by an attorney, and she falsely stated in the act that she was
unmarried. Eight months after the plaintiffs were granted custody of the
child, the mother filed an opposition to their petition for an interlocutory
decree of adoption. The trial court found the mother's consent valid and
that the subsequent withdrawal did not automatically bar the interlocutory
decree. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and held
that the act executed by the mother was not a valid act of surrender under
the private adoption statutes. In re CDT, 415 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1982).
The court's decision in CDT led to precisely the type of result that
the legislature, by enacting the recent 1979 amendments to the private
adoption laws, had sought to avoid. Private adoption in Louisiana has
had a troubled past, and in 1979 the legislature attempted to provide a
means of circumventing many of the problems associated with this type
of adoption. It established a new method of effecting private adoption
that substantially curtails the ability of natural parents to revoke parental
consent and ensures that the best interests of the child are served. However,
if the courts follow the CDT decision, they will severely limit the remedial
effect of this new legislation. The court's narrow construction of the
statutory language damaged the purpose of the amendments. To under-
stand this purpose and to give the 1979 amendments their intended ef-
fect, it is necessary to understand the context in which they were enacted.
Private Adoption in Louisiana-Historical Background
Adoption may be defined as the establishment of a parent-child rela-
tionship between persons not so related by nature;' it creates a status and
not merely a contractual relationship.' Adoption is a creature of statute;
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. In Louisiana, the law of adoption can be traced back to Justinian's time, when
it was developed into a highly sophisticated, codified procedure. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM Auousrus TO JusTINIAN 123, 129 (2d ed. 1952); see also Huard,
The Law of Adoption Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743, 746 (1956); Katz, Rewriting
the Adoption Story, 5 Fam. Advoc. 9, 9 (Summer 1982) ("Adoption laws and practices
have followed the Roman legal tradition of attempting to make law mirror biology ...
[and] imitate nature."); Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adop-
tion, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971). Adoption was initially introduced into Louisiana by Spanish
law, but was abolished when Louisiana became a state. The few adoptions that were per-
mitted after this time were effected pursuant to specific legislative acts. Roy v. Speer, 249
La. 1034, 1038, 192 So. 2d 554, 556 (1966). However, the Louisiana Constitution of 1864,
LA. Co sT. of 1864, tit. VII, art. 117, again authorized adoptions either privately between
the natural and adoptive parents or through an agency. 1865 La. Acts, No. 48. See generally
Wadlington, Adoption of Persons Under Seventeen in Louisiana, 36 TuL. L. REv. 201 (1962).
2. Succession of Gambino, 225 La. 674, 680, 73 So. 2d 800, 802 (1954).
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it exists only by virtue of the legislative acts. that authorize it.,
In Louisiana, this status may be created by following either of two
established methods-agency adoption or private adoption. Of the two,
agency adoption has been the traditionally favored method.' The reasons
for this preference are clear: agency adoptions offer the safeguards of
guaranteed anonymity, a simple expeditious procedure, and irrevocable
parental consent.' In addition, the procedure is highly regulated and super-
vised and the agencies attempt to obtain the most compatible match be-
tween the child to be adopted and the prospective parents.'
In comparison to the relatively simple and safe course of agency adop-
tion, private adoption has been fraught with both administrative and prac-
tical difficulties. In the past, all private adoptions involved the elaborate
time-consuming requirement of two court hearings-the first to determine
whether an interlocutory decree should be granted,' and the second to
determine whether a final decree of adoption should be granted.' Until
1960, parental consent to the adoption was revocable and could be
withdrawn after an interlocutory decree had been granted.' This power
of the natural parents to revoke a consent already given was a direct result
3. Hargrave v. Gaspard, 419 So. 2d 918, 920-21 (La. 1982) ("Adoption is a privilege
which exists only where expressly granted by statute and is subject to statutory restrictions
and exceptions."); In re Spraggins, 234 So. 2d 462, 463 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
4. Wadlington, supra note 1, at 211. Louisiana, in addition to having provisions for
both agency and private adoption, also provides for two types of private adoption: (1) the
adoption of minors under 17, LA. R.S. 9:421 (Supp. 1983); and (2) the adoption of persons
over 17, LA. R.S. 9:461 (Supp. 1983).
5. LA. R.S. 9:404 deals with the effect of voluntary surrender or decree of abandon-
ment. LA. R.S. 9:407 deals with child placement. See In re Jackson, 312 So. 2d 912 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1975). Once a mother surrenders her child to a licensed adoption agency
and formally consents to adoption, the consent need not continue and a change of mind
afterwards is immaterial. If there is notice of consent, the formal act of surrender is perma-
nent and irrevocable. Allen v. Volunteers of America, 378 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979).
6. Harve, Adoption: New Rules for the Million Dollar Matching Game, 3 FAm. ADvoc.
20 (Fall 1980).
7. LA. R.S. 9:429 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686,
§ 4).
8. LA. R.S. 9:432(B) (1965).
9. LA. R.S. 9:429 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1960 La. Acts, No. 268,
§ 2). In Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819 (1947), the court, after an in-depth
review of legislative intent, reaffirmed prior jurisprudence and held that a final decree of
adoption could not be granted under Act 154 of 1942 without the continuing consent of
the natural parent of the child. The court stated:
Since the act or judgment of adoption has the effect of transferring the legal
relation from the natural parents to the adoptive parents, it is generally made
requisite in adoption statutes that the consent of the natural parents be had in
order that the adoption be valid. . ..
Therefore, since consent is essential, it would seem to follow that it must be
of a continuing nature and that the withdrawal of consent prior to rendition of
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of the requirement that parental consent be of a continuing nature
throughout the adoption procedure. The continuing threat of revocation
of parental consent that existed under the old private adoption procedures
was the fundamental cause of the confusion and uncertainty in private
adoptions. o
The requirement of parental consent in adoptions is based upon the
well established natural right of a parent to his child," a right that has
received constitutional recognition and protection.' 2 Upon a decree of adop-
tion, the rights and duties of the natural parents toward their child are
severed and terminated,' 3 and reestablished in the adoptive parents. This
transfer of rights is in derogation of the natural biological parent-child
a final decree is just as effective a bar to the adoption as though the consent
had never been given.
212 La. at 344-45, 31 So. 2d at 821-22. See also Pascal, Consent to Adoption, 16 LA.
L. REV. 226 (1956). Although the parents had the right to revoke the consent once an in-
terlocutory decree had been rendered, practically, it was not so easy. The statute stipulated
that the court could revoke its interlocutory decree for "good cause" and on its own mo-
tion, that of the State Department of Public Welfare, or on the motion of any person
or persons interested in said child. Therefore, the parents had to show "good cause" to
have the decree set aside.
10. State ex rel. Simpson v. Salter, 211 La. 918, 928, 31 So. 2d 163, 166 (1947) ("The
consent of the parents of a child sought to be adopted is essential and sacramental.");
Rodden v. Davis, 293 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 296 So. 2d 832 (1974);
see also Comment, A Survey of State Law Authorizing Step-Parent Adoptions Without
the Non-Custodial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. REV. 567 (1982); Comment, Termina-
tion of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child, 14 J. FAM. L. 547 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Termination of Parental Rights]. Another reason for the
uncertainty associated with private adoptions is that there has never been a particular form
provided by the statutes to either grant or withdraw consent. See Moreland v. Craft, 244
So. 2d 37, 41 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 348, 246 So. 2d 197 (1971).
11. Roy v. Speer, 249 La. 1034, 1040, 192 So. 2d 554, 556 (1966); Adoption of Ed-
wards, 369 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); see Comment, Family Law--Termination
of Parental Rights-A New Standard for Balancing the Rights of Parents, Children and
Society, 24 EMORY L.J. 183, 184 (1975) ("[The] entire field of adoption and custody law
has been based on the premise that natural or biological parents have an inherent superior
right to the custody and control of their child.").
12. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that parents have a fun-
damental privacy interest in controlling the- upbringing of their children. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (held that the fourteenth amendment guarantee of liberty
protects the right of individuals to marry, establish a home, and bring up children); see
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1956); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13. Civil Code article 214 provides in pertinent part:
[Ulpon adoption: the blood parent or parents and all other blood relatives of
the adopted person, except as provided by R.S. 9:572(B), are relieved of all of
their legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights with regard to the adopted
person . . . ; and the adopted person and his lawful descendants are relieved
of all of their legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights with regard
to the blood parent or parents and other blood relatives, except the right of in-
heritance from them.
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relationship, and as a result the courts have consistently declared that the
requirements for a valid act of adoption are to be strictly and narrowly
construed. '4
Louisiana has long recognized the problems inherent in a private adop-
tion scheme in which continuing parental consent is a prerequisite. Thus,
in 1932, the legislature began the first of numerous attempts to provide
a framework for private adoptions that would ensure the protection of
both the child and the natural parents. Act 46 of 1932 authorized private
adoptions in which parental consent could be given either in an authentic
act or in a private act duly acknowledged signed by the adoptive and
natural parents.' 5 The Act also required that natural parents be made par-
ties to the proceedings.'"
A 1938 amendment later dispensed with the notarial act as evidence
of consent, and provided instead that adoption proceedings be initiated
by a judicial petition presented by the proposed adoptive parents.' 7 Since
this amendment which aimed at ensuring the regulation of an increasing
number of private adoptions, court supervision and authorization has been
an integral part of the private adoption scheme.'" Act 228 of 1948 ulti-
mately incorporated all changes in the adoption laws for minors under
17, and, in 1950, that act was adopted as Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:421-:441.1' Throughout these legislative changes, the legislature empha-
sized the importance of the requirement of continuing parental consent
in the private adoption law, and the jurisprudence reflected this emphasis."0
14. The rationale for this jurisprudential and constitutional requirement was succinctly
stated in Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337,. 31 So. 2d 819 (1947), which noted that the laws
of adoption "must be given a strict construction as they are in derogation of the natural
right of the parent to his child." 212 La. at 346 n.2, 31 So. 2d at 822 n.2. See Roy v.
Speer, 249 La. 1034, 1040, 192 So. 2d 554, 556 (1966) ("Ties between parent and child,
being the closest and strongest within the human family, courts sever them with extreme
reluctance."); see also In re Ackenhausen, 244 La. 730, 739, 154 So. 2d 380, 383 (1963);
Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 343, 31 So. 2d 819, 821 (1947); State ex rel. Simpson v. Salter,
211 La. 918, 927, 31 So. 2d 163, 166 (1947); Owles v. Jackson, 199 La. 940, 946-47, 7
So. 2d 192, 194 (1942); Moreland v. Craft, 244 So. 2d 37, 41 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
refused, 258 La. 348, 246 So. 2d 197 (1971); In re Spraggins, 234 So. 2d 462, 463 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970). See generally Golz y. Children's Bureau, 326 So. 2d 865 (La.), appeal
dismissed, 426 U.S. 901 (1976); Comment, Termination of Parental Rights, supra note 10.
15. 1932 La. Acts, No. 46, § 1.
16. 1932 La. Acts, No. 46, § 2. Section 2 states in pertinent part: "The parents of
said person shall be made parties to said petition and if their whereabouts are unknown
or if they reside out of the state . . . a curator-ad-hoc . . . shall make an earnest effort
to notify said parties .... "
17. 1938 La. Acts, No. 428, §§ 1-2.
18. Note, Adoption-Consent-Revocation of Consent by Natural Parents-Louisiana
Act 154 of 1942, 22 TUL. L. REv. 513, 514 (1948).
19. See Wadlington, supra note 1, at 205.
20. Madere v. Long, 231 La. 498, 503-04, 91 So. 2d 771, 773 (1956); In re Byrd, 226
La. 194, 198, 75 So. 2d 331, 332 (1954). In Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 345, 31 So. 2d
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For instance, in Green v. Paul 2' the court said that "while there are
a few pronouncements to the contrary, the preponderance of the
jurisprudence is that the continuing consent of the natural parent is vital
to the validity of the adoption decree." ' 22 However, despite this emphasis
on the requirement of continuing parental consent, it was never deemed
to be indispensable to a valid private adoption-the courts could, on their
own motion or through a petition from the Department of Public Welfare,
override the continuing consent requirement for "good cause." 23
Nevertheless, as it stood in 1960, the private adoption procedure left
the adoptive parents in a precarious position. Natural parents were able
to withdraw their consent after an interlocutory decree and effectively block
a final decree of adoption. Natural parents could then use their necessary
continuing consent as a bargaining tool in an effort to reach some kind
of financial arrangement with the adoptive parents. In addition, since the
natural parents could revoke their consent after the interlocutory decree,
many children were returned to their natural parents after considerable
periods of time with their adoptive parents. 2 These decisions were most
often detrimental to the interests of the child, who had formed neither
emotional nor psychological links with his natural parents.
819, 821 (1947) the court stated: "Therefore, since consent is essential, it would seem to
follow that it must be of a continuing nature and that the withdrawal of consent prior
to rendition of a final decree is just as effective a bar to the adoption as though the consent
had never been given."
21. 212 La. 337, 31 So. 2d 819 (1947).
22. 212 La. at 347, 31 So. 2d at 822.
23. Section 11 of Act 228 of 1948 stated in pertinent part: "At any time before the
entry of the final decree of adoption the court for good cause may revoke its interlocutory
decree .... " Emphasis added. Justice Hamiter in his dissent in Green defined good cause
as "the unfitness of the adoptive parents for the child or the unsuitability of the proposed
adoption arrangement (but for no other reason)." 212 La. at 353, 31 So. 2d at 824. See
also In re Adoption of Giambrane, 262 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
24. See, e.g., In re Byrd, 226 La. 194, 75 So. 2d 331 (1954). In Byrd, consent to
the adoption was given in a notarial act by an unmarried mother. The mother withdrew
her consent almost four years later and successfully prevented the adoption. Justice Hawthorne
dissented and said if consent was freely and voluntarily given, that its withdrawal should
not be an absolute bar. In the case of In re Adoption of Gordon, 135 So. 2d 673 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962), the natural mother at a hearing on the first petiton by the adoptive
parents unconditionally consented to the entry of the interlocutory decree. The mother did
not appear at a final hearing which granted the final decree, but the records revealed that
at this time she objected to the adoption and indicated as much to the representatives of
the Department of Public Welfare. Upon renewal of the case, the court, after three and
one-half years, ordered that the child be returned to the natural mother. In his dissent
in Green, Justice Hamiter spoke out against such occurrences.
It is inconceivable that the Legislature, in the enactment of the adoption law,
could have. contemplated a breaking of those bonds of affection as well as the
wasting of the adoptive parents' efforts, by reason of the unstable whims and
fancies of the natural parent-by the mere changing of his mind.
212 La. at 356-57, 31 So. 2d at 825.
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As a result of these practical problems, the requirement of continu-
ing consent was legislatively abrogated by Act 268 of 1960 which added
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:429 the following sentence: "After the
interlocutory decree has been granted by the judge, the withdrawal of
consent by the legitimate parent or parents, by the mother or by the father
who has acknowledged the child ... shall not bar a final decree of adop-
tion." This amendment represented the legislature's attempt to remedy
the situation by shortening the time period within which natural parents
could prevent an adoption by revoking their consent.
Current Law-The 1979 Amendments
The Private Adoption Act of 19795 is the most recent attempt by
the legislature to formalize and regulate private adoption, while promoting
the best interests of the child and balancing the interests of the biological
and adoptive parents.16 The legislature attempted to guarantee to private
adoptions some of the safeguards traditionally associated with agency adop-
tions. After an overview of past amendments and an evaluation of the
state of private adoptions at the time, perhaps the legislature felt that
the only way to ensure a safe method of private adoption was to provide
a method of legal surrender that further limited the possibility of revoca-
tion of consent."
A method of voluntary legal surrender was provided which eliminates
the ability of natural parents to block an adoption by an arbitrary revoca-
tion of consent and ensures that the best interests of the child remain
the paramount consideration in all stages of the adoption proceedings. 8
However, if parental consent is invalid from the outset of the adoption
proceedings, the consent requirement will not be met, and the adoption
proceeding under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.3 will
be nullified.
25. 1979 La. Acts, No. 686. For a general review of this legislation, see Selected Legisla-
tion of the 1979 Regular Session-A Student Commentary, 40 LA. L. REv. 466, 468 (1980).
26. A Student Commentary, supra note 25, at 469. The statute still requires two hear-
ings in a private adoption procedure. At the initial hearing, after examining the confidential
report prepared by the Department of Public Welfare, and after interrogating the parties,
the judge may render an interlocutory decree of adoption. The court then gives custody
of the child to the adoptive parents and after a period of at least one year and six months
from the grant of the interlocutory decree, the petitioner may apply for a final decree of
adoption. The statute also makes provision for specific circumstances in which a final decree
can be granted at an initial hearing. LA. R.S. 9:434 (Supp. 1983).
27. 1979 La. Acts, No. 686, § 1, adding LA. R.S. 9:422.8, .10, .11.
28. The method of legal surrender set out in LA. R.S. 9:422.3 bars the revocation of
consent after 30 days. Furthermore, revocation of consent within this 30-day period will
not affect the adoption proceeding if it is in the best interests of the child to remain with
the adoptive parents. The consideration in the event that the interests of natural parents
conflict with the interests of providing a quick, reliable procedure for private adoption,
[Vol. 44
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Certain formalities must be observed in order to take advantage of
the additional protection provided by the new method of surrender. The
statute specifies two prerequisites for the execution of a valid surrender
of parental rights under the new amendment: (1) A voluntary surrender
of permanent custody of a child cannot be made until five days after
the child's birth,2" and (2) parental consent to an adoption must be given
in a authentic act of surrender containing information that ensures the
voluntary nature of the surrender.3" These provisions seek to ensure that
the parent or parents are given time to reflect upon the desirability of
surrendering their newborn child and to appreciate the gravity and final-
ity of the surrender. 3 The five-day period which a parent cannot waive"
is the child's best interests. LA. R.S. 9:422.11 states in pertinent part: "The withdrawal
of the consent of either or both of the parents who both executed the formal act of sur-
render shall not bar a final or interlocutory decree of adoption, if the decree is in the
best interests of the child."
29. LA. R.S. 9:422.7 states in pertinent part: "The formal act of voluntary surrender
shall not be signed earlier than the fifth day following the date of the birth of the child
to be surrendered."
30. LA. R.S. 9:422.6 requires identification of the parents, the child, and the adoptive
parents. In addition, the authentic act must recite:
(1) the date of birth of the child to be surrendered and that the act is not signed
earlier than the fifth day following that date; (2) that the parent or parents freely
and voluntarily surrender custody of the child for the purpose of private place-
ment and adoption; (3) that the parent or parents consent to the adoption; (4)
that the parent or parents have been informed and understand that their rights
as parents of the child are to be terminated, and (5) that notice and service of
any pleading of any sort in any subsequent adoption proceeding is waived.
31. In re Williams, 334 So. 2d 811, 812 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). The court found
that the natural mother was not fully informed of the legal consequences of the adoption;
therefore, she did not give free or valid consent. The court ordered the child returned to
her. However, under the 1979 statute, if the mother gives her consent to the adoption in
an act of voluntary surrender five days after the birth of the child and if at the time she
is represented by an attorney, one can safely presume that she is fully informed of the
legal consequences of the adoption.
This five-day grace period is particularly important to an unwed mother because it gives
her time to consider the enormity of the decision before her. In an attempt to decrease
the number of abortions, the legislature saw fit to provide a means for an unwed mother
to consent to the adoption of the child without the consent of the father. Note, Adoption:
The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REv. 923, 935 (1980).
LA. R.S. 9:422.4 states: "The father and mother indicated on the certified copy of the
child's birth certificate provided in R.S. 9:422.2 must join in signing the authentic act of
surrender of that child. If the father of the child is not indicated, the mother may sign
the authentic act of surrender alone." The unnamed father may oppose the adoption only
by proof of his formal acknowledgment or legitimation of the child prior to the decree
of adoption. LA. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1983). The wording of this provision and of LA.
R.S. 9:422.3, .12 indicates perhaps that these provisions were drafted with particular reference
to the unwed mother and her newborn child. See generally Kirsh v. Parker, 375 So. 2d
693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979). The 1979 amendment is evidently part of a trend which at-
tempts to persuade pregnant women to elect adoption over abortion.
32. LA. R.S. 9:422.7 (Supp. 1983) (consent irrevocable after a period of 30 days).
1984]
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is a necessary precondition to a valid surrender. This inflexible, standard
condition to every adoption made according to the procedure provided
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.3 is evidence of the legislature's ap-
preciation that the time of pregnancy and birth can be a period of stress
and emotional instability.33 Thus, a parent is now bound by law to wait
until after the birth of the child to make a choice. It was no doubt hoped
that this would ensure more rational and carefully considered decisions.
Once these formalities are complied with,3" the authentic act of sur-
render evidences irrevocable parental consent and automatically terminates
parental rights." No further notification to or participation by the natural
parents is required," and from the time the authentic act of surrender
is executed, custody of the child is vested in the adoptive parents named
in the act.3"
An act of surrender that fails to meet all the requirements of a sur-
render as set forth in the new Act, however, is not necessarily an invalid
act of surrender. The surrender may not afford the adoptive parents the
advantages and protections of the procedure authorized by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:422.3, but this does not mean that the surrender is
invalid for purposes of other adoption proceedings authorized by state
law.3
The CDT Court's Rationale
In the instant case, the second circuit held the consent given by the
mother invalid due to the failure to meet the statutory requirements for
valid consent to a private adoption. The act of surrender had been signed
within five days of the birth of the child, and the mother was not
represented by counsel.39 The CDT court stated:
33. This five-day period is necessary to avoid situations such as State ex rel. Simpson
v. Salter, 211 La. 218, 31 So. 2d 163 (1947). In Salter the child was born on March 1,
1946 and on March 5 was taken by the adoptive parents. On March 7, 1946 the mother
revoked her consent and on April 27, 1947, the court awarded the child back to her. Because
the days immediately prior to and following birth are highly emotional, this five-day safeguard
period seems proper.
34. See LA. R.S. 9:422.3-.8, .10-.11 (Supp. 1983).
35. LA. R.S. 9:422.8 states that "the formal act of voluntary surrender grants the ir-
revocable consent." The exception to this is provided in LA. R.S. 9:422.10 which considers
the best interests of the child within the 30-day period given to a natural parent to oppose
the adoption. Civil Code article 214 deals with the termination of parental rights.
36. LA. R.S. 9:422.12 provides that once a child is legally surrendered, no notice or
service of any pleading is required to be made on any surrendering parent. Their parental
rights have in effect been terminated.
37. LA. R.S. 9:422.8 (Supp. 1983).
38. The other adoption proceedings are discussed infra notes 41-55 and accompanying
text.
39. 415 So. 2d at 318.
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The legislature has provided for a specific and exclusive method
by which private adoptions are to be carried out. That procedure
as set forth in LSA-R.S. 9:422.3 et seq. provides for an act of
surrender to be executed in the manner prescribed. . . .Thus an
act that fails to comply with the requirements as set forth in
LSA-R.S. 9:422.3 et seq. is without effect.
4
1
Despite the court's assertion to the contrary, the legislature has pro-
vided more than one method of private adoption. Extensive authority
establishes beyond question that the method of private adoption established
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.3 is not exclusive and that an act of
surrender that meets the requirements of section 422.3 is not necessary
in all cases to effect a valid private adoption. This authority stems from
three sources: (1) the very existence of other adoption statutes under which
private adoptions may be effected, (2) the purposes and intended scope
of operation of the adoption scheme established in section 422.3, and (3)
the jurisprudence construing the adoption statutes.
Other Adoption Statutes
Valid private adoptions are permitted without any act of surrender
whatsoever in certain unique situations. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.1
permits adoptions sought by a stepparent or grandparents. 4 ' Section 422.1
is designed to provide for the protection and best interests of the child
and the rights of natural parents in such a situation. Thus, a condition
of adoptions under section 422.1 not found in adoptions under section
422.3 is that the petitioner's spouse or the grandparents must have been
granted custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction prior
to the petition for adoption. In addition, in the case of stepparent adop-
tions, the other legitimate parent must have failed to provide support or
to communicate with the child.4 2 If these prerequisites are met, then non-
custodial parental consent is specifically dispensed with.43 Section 422.1
clearly does not require an authentic act of surrender in accordance with
section 422.3 to ensure a valid act of adoption.
40. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
41. See Steed v. McKenzie, 344 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
42. LA. R.S. 9:422.1 enumerates the conditions whereby a noncustodial legitimate parent
forfeits his or her right to his or her child:
(1) The other legitimate parent has refused or failed to comply with a court
order of support for a period of one year.
(2) The other legitimate parent is a nonresident of this state and has failed
to support the child for a period of one year after judgment awarding custody
to the mother or father or grandparent or grandparents.
(3) The other legitimate parent has refused or failed to visit, communicate, or
attempt to communicate with the child, without just cause, for a period of two
years.
43. Adoption of Latiolais, 376 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 384 So.
19841
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Parental consent is also unnecessary in adoptions under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:403, when a child has been declared abandoned. This
section provides that if the facts constituting abandonment are proved
by clear and convincing evidence, the court may place the child in the
custody of an agency or with a private person or persons."' A declaration
of abandonment deprives the natural parents of all rights to object or
oppose any proceedings for the adoption of that child.4 ' Thus, the per-
son or persons awarded custody of a child in an abandonment proceeding
have greater rights to that child than a person who is awarded custody
of a child subsequent to an authentic act of surrender under section 422.3.
In the latter instance, natural parents may attempt to oppose an adoption
for a thirty-day period following the execution of an act of surrender.
Admittedly, sections 422.1 and 403 provide for exceptional cir-
cumstances. The mere existence of these statutes, however, suggests that
the statement of the CDT court-that section 422.3 provides the exclusive
method of private adoption-is, at the very least, overly broad. Further-
more, in addition to these statutes which provide for exceptional cir-
cumstances, there exists one other general method of effecting private
adoptions (after the 1979 amendments) that does not require an authentic
act of surrender meeting all the requirements of section 422.3.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:429 recognizes that parental consent to
a private adoption may validly be given in a notarial act that fails to
meet all of the requirements of section 422.3.46 Section 429 provides in
pertinent part that "[t]he withdrawal of consent to the adoption of a child,
once given in a notarial act by the parent or parents of the child, shall
2d 377 (La. 1980); see In re Coile, 343 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 345
So. 2d 902 (La. 1977); Adoption of Edwards, 369 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
LA. R.S. 9:432, which provides that in all final decrees of adoption the basic consideration
is the best interests of the child, does not authorize entry of a decree of adoption solely
on a showing of best interests in disregard of the rights of natural parents. In order for
a decree of adoption to be rendered without the consent of a natural parent or parents,
there must be a showing that the natural parent lost his rights to the child, either by volun-
tary surrender, by abandonment, or under some other statutory provision. See Cantrell v.
Talley, 291 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
44. LA. R.S. 9:403(C) (Supp. 1983).
45. LA. R.S. 9:404 (1965).
46. The trial court in CDT stated:
In the instant case, where the legislature provides for an "authentic act of volun-
tary surrender" executed according to certain formalities and creating certain ef-
fects upon its execution, and providing for certain limitations for its revocation
and the effects thereof, and later in another section of the act, relating to dif-
ferent procedures for adoption provides for the effects of a withdrawal of con-
sent (not surrender) where given by Notarial Act, where a Notarial Act does not
even require witnesses much less the formalities prescribed in the procedure set
forth in R.S. 422.3 thru 422.12, it is not the same thing.
In re Trahan, No. 6868, at 11 (La. Juv. Ct., Caddo Parish Nov. 9, 1981).
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not bar an interlocutory decree of adoption, if the court considers the
decree in the best interest of the child."
Intended Scope of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.3
The court in CDT expressly rejected the argument that Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:429 provided an alternative method of surrender that
could become effective if a section 422.3 act of surrender was found
defective.4 7 The CDT court's position, however, appears to be based on
a hasty reading of the new amendment. Section 422.3 was not intended
to displace any of the methods of private adoption in effect at the time
of its enactment; it was intended only to provide an additional method
of effecting private adoptions with greater attendant protections. Several
of the adoption statutes bear this out.
Section 429 was amended in 1979 together with the other adoption
provisions. Prior to the 1979 amendment, the operation of Section 429
was not restricted to any particular form of parental consent. It simply
provided that once an interlocutory decree of adoption had been granted,
withdrawal of consent would not bar a final decree of adoption. The 1979
amendment to section 429, however, refers to consent given in a "notarial
act." 4  It could be argued that the "notarial act" language in section
429 is nothing more than a reference to the authentic act of surrender
that was introduced into the private adoption laws by the 1979 amend-
ments themselves. Indeed, the court in CDT adopted this position. Yet,
the converse may legitimately be argued; the language of section 429 should
be interpreted literally as a reference to the acts of surrender executed
in the presence of a notary that were previously accepted as evidence of
valid parental consent. 9
The effect of the withdrawal of a consent given in an authentic act
executed pursuant to section 422.3 is specifically addressed in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:422.11, which states: "The withdrawal of the consent
of either or both of the parents who both executed the formal act of
surrender shall not bar a final or interlocutory decree of adoption, if the
decree is in the best interests of the child." Section 429, on the other
47. 415 So. 2d at 318.
48. 1979 La. Acts, No. 686, § 4, quoted supra text following note 46.
49. For instance, the trial court in CDT stated:
A notarial consent is not the same as an "Authentic Act of Voluntary Sur-
render" as set forth in .9:422.3 thru 9:422.12. It is simply a consent executed
before a notary public (and in this case, two witnesses) evidencing a consent to
adoption. The legislature has deliniated [sic] in Act 686 its references to 422.3
et seq proceedings. This is a new and special proceeding. The effect of a revoca-
tion of a 9:422.3 surrender on an interlocutory decree is specifically covered in
9:422.11.
In re Trahan, No. 6868, at 9 (La. Juv. Ct., Caddo Parish Nov. 9, 1981).
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hand, refers to the withdrawal of consent given in a "notarial act." That
provision states that an interlocutory decree of adoption of the type
specifically governed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:432(B) shall not be
barred if it is in the best interests of the child, despite withdrawal of
consent. It is not likely that the legislature, in the same set of amend-
ments, would have enacted two identical provisions, both using the same
best interests test, to control in the event that the consent given in an
authentic act of surrender under section 422.3 is withdrawn. If this were
so, section 429 would simply be superfluous, a repetition of section 422.11.
Therefore, it is rational to conclude that section 429 provides for
withdrawal of a consent given in a notarial act in cases where the pro-
cedure outlined in section 422.3 is not used.
A comparison of sections 422.3 and 429 as amended in 1979 indicates
that section 429 basically incorporates most of the same protections found
in section 422.3. Both section 429 and section 422.3 require that parental
consent be formally expressed in an act executed in the presence of a
notary. Thus, in both adoption procedures, the natural parents are pro-
tected by a requirement ensuring that the consent is informed, i.e., it must
be evidenced by the deliberate act of consenting before a notary." Both
procedures require two court hearings. In addition, both statutes attempt
to ensure that the best interests of the child remain the paramount con-
sideration in the adoption proceedings. The natural parents' revocation
of a valid consent will not bar a decree of adoption under either section
if the trial judge, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him, con-
cludes that the adoption would be in the best interests of the child. Despite
the similarities between sections 429 and 422.3 and the protections they
afford, the two statutes establish distinct methods of effecting private
adoptions.
There are three important differences in sections 422.3 and 429 and
the proceedings under each of these statutes. These differences are found
in the formal requirements of the acts of surrender and the extent of
the protections afforded. The first of these differences lies in the prereq-
uisites for a valid act of surrender. Under section 422.3 consent must
be given in an authentic act which requires more information than that
50. Evidence of tacit parental consent to adoption may still be permissible, but such
consent will no longer be attended by the protections provided in section 429. In the past,
evidence of tacit parental consent was permitted in adoption proceedings associated with
section 429 because no particular form of parental consent was required under section 429.
The 1979 amendments, however, restricted the operation of section 429 to situations in which
the natural parents' consent to the adoption was given in a notarial act. Thus, while evidence
of tacit parental consent may still be permissible in adoption proceedings associated with
section 429, if such consent were withdrawn before the interlocutory decree, the withdrawal
would bar any subsequent decree of adoption.
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required under section 429.1' By requiring more information in the act
of surrender, section 422.3 arguably provides more protection for the
natural parents. However, because additional formalities are required in
the section 422.3 surrender, an act of surrender that fails to comply with
the requirements of an authentic act under section 422.3 may nevertheless
be considered a valid notarial act under section 429.
The second difference between these sections is found in an additional
restriction upon the ability of the natural parents to revoke a validly ex-
ecuted act of surrender in proceedings under section 422.3. Once a con-
sent has been given pursuant to section 422.3, the natural parents ex-
ecuting the act of legal surrender may attempt to revoke their consent
to the adoption of the child only as provided in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:422.10. This provision requires that revocation be made in a clear, written
declaration within thirty days of the authentic act of surrender." This
51. LA. R.S. 422.6 provides:
The formal act of surrender shall identify the parents or parent of the child
by name, parish of domicile, age, and marital status; shall identify the child and
the parish of birth of the child; shall indicate the name and address of the person
or persons to whom the surrender is made, or the name and address of the represen-
tative of that person or persons; and shall recite: (1) the date of birth of the
child to be surrendered and that the act is not signed earlier than the fifth day
following that date; (2) that the parent or parents freely and voluntarily surrender
custody of the child for the purpose of private placement and adoption; (3) that
the parent or parents consent to the adoption; (4) that the parent or parents have
been informed and understand that their rights as parents of the child are to
be terminated, and (5) that notice and service of any pleading of any sort in
any subsequent adoption proceeding is waived. Should a surrendering parent of
the child be under the age of eighteen at the time of signing, the formal act shall
also recite that fact and shall state that the surrendering parent under the age
of eighteen is joined in signing the formal act of surrender by those individuals
indicated in R.S. 9:422.3. Each necessary party must sign in the presence of a
notary and two witnesses, although it is not necessary that they sign the same
instrument.
See, e.g., Adoption of Vest, 427 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 429 So.
2d 123 (La. 1983). In this case an act of surrender executed by the natural parents was
fatally deficient because it failed to recite that the mother of the child was under eighteen
at the time of the signing of the act and because the parents of the minor mother should
have, but did not, join in the act. The court stated:
The pertinent statutory law clearly and unambiguously sets forth the requirements
for a valid surrender of a child for adoption. The act executed by Appellees does
not meet those requirements, therefore, it is not valid. Lacking a valid consent
by both parents to the adoption of the child, Appellants' petition for adoption
must be denied.
Id. at 1361. See also In re G.O., 433 So. 2d 1115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
52. LA. R.S. 9:422.10 states in pertinent part:
The parents executing the act of legal surrender, acting jointly or individually,
may oppose the adoption of the child surrendered only by a clear, written declara-
tion of the revocation, made within thirty days after executing the formal act
of surrender. The writing must reasonably identify the child surrendered and the
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is the only way in which consent may be revoked once given pursuant
to section 422.3. If the natural parents do not attempt to withdraw their
consent in this manner within the thirty-day period, they are forever bar-
red from attempting to revoke the consent in the future. The adoptive
parents are thus assured, after the passage of this thirty-day period, that
the child will remain in their custody, unless under section 422.11 they
are found to be unfit, or there is an unfavorable recommendation by the
Department of Health and Human Resources prior to the final decree. 3
Section 429 does not provide an absolute bar to revocation of consent
after a thirty-day period, and it does not require any particular form of
revocation. Under this provision, parents may attempt to revoke their con-
sent until the rendition of the interlocutory decree; even after an attemp-
ted revocation, however, the trial judge may still grant the interlocutory
decree if it is in the best interests of the child to do so.
Finally, a distinction must be drawn between section 422.3 private
adoptions and other private adoptions with respect to when the adoptive
parents may apply for the final decree of adoption. Under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:432, a final decree of adoption may be sought when
the child has lived with the petitioners for one year and at least six months
from the time of an interlocutory decree. 4 However, if the private adop-
tion is one accomplished under section 422.3, a final decree may be ap-
plied for when the child has lived with the petitioners for at least six
months.55 The logical conclusion is that subsection 432(A) governs all situa-
tions in which the consent given does not meet the requirements of sec-
tion 422.3.
Thus, in CDT, had the court construed section 422.3 as an additional,
but not exclusive, method of private adoption, the natural parents could
have attempted to revoke their consent. However, the court's evaluation
of the best interests of the child would have governed the effect to be
given the revocation under section 429.
Jurisprudence
Several circuit court decisions also support the proposition that Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 9:422.3 is not the exclusive method of effecting
act of surrender; attaching a copy of the act of legal surrender being sufficient.
A copy of the writing must be sent by certified or registered mail to the person
or persons, or their representative, identified in the act of surrender to whom
the custody of the child was granted to be of any effect.
53. LA. R.S. 9:434 (Supp. 1983).
54. LA. R.S. 9:432(A) specifies that the same procedures prescribed in LA. R.S. 9:428-:429
for an interlocutory decree are to be followed for a final decree.
55. LA. R.S. 9:432(C) (Supp. 1983). Section 432(C) makes no mention of sections 428
and 429. Section 428 provides the time limit within which a hearing of the adoption petition
must take place.
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private adoptions. For instance, in In re Simon56 the third circuit held
that an interlocutory decree of adoption was properly granted, even though
the formal act of surrender executed by the child's mother was deficient
because it failed to set forth all the information required by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:422.6. In Simon, the mother had died a month after
the child's birth and the father was unknown. Thus, no person could
have executed a voluntary act of surrender pursuant to section 422.3 which
provides that "[t]he parent or parents of a child . . . may execute an
authentic act of voluntary surrender." Clearly, then, section 422.3 was
inapplicable. The court noted that there appeared to be a hiatus in the
law with respect to private adoptions when facts and circumstances such
as those present in the case before it existed.5 7 The court felt that the
legislature did not intend to prohibit private adoption in such situations,
and it applied the basic test of the best interests of the child in light of
the facts of the case." Simon is, therefore, an example of a situation
that is not provided for in section 422.3. It is difficult, then, to argue
that section 422.3 is exclusive if it does not provide for every contingency.
In re Shavor" involved a stepfather attempting to adopt his wife's
six-year-old son. The court found that the natural father could consent
to the adoption of his son by notarial act under section 422 rather than
by strict compliance with the procedures contained in section 422.6.60 A
reading of this decision indicates that where consent is needed, it may
validly be granted in a notarial act that fails to comply with the stringent
requirements of section 422.3.6
In short, the other adoption statutes, the intended scope of the amend-
ments, and the jurisprudence all indicate that Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:422.3 is not the exclusive means of private adoption authorized by Loui-
siana law. Section 422.3 simply added an additional and alternative method
of effecting private adoptions, a method providing greater safeguards than
the methods of adoption already authorized by Louisiana law. The court's
emphatic statement in CDT that an act of surrender that fails to meet
the requirements of section 422.3 is completely invalid was, therefore, un-
56. 406 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 268.
58. Id. at 268-69. The court also relied on the decision of In re Ryals, 231 La. 683,
92 So. 2d 581 (1957), which under facts similar to those of Simon, held that the best in-
terests of the child should apply.
59. 408 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 388.
61. Although the natural father had revoked his consent to the adoption prior to the
interlocutory decree, the court concluded after examining LA. R.S. 9:429, :432, :434, that
such a withdrawal of consent did not lead inexorably to a denial of a decree of adoption.
The case was remanded to the lower court to make a determination of the child's best
interests. For the outcome, see In re Shavor, 428 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 433 So. 2d 155 (La. 1983).
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warranted. It is important to reiterate that an act of surrender that does
not meet all the requirements of a section 422.3 act of surrender is in-
valid for purposes of the adoption procedure authorized in section 422.3.
Any failure to comply with the requirements of section 422.3 in regard
to an act of surrender, in view of the attitude that adoption statutes must
be strictly construed, will defeat the use of this safer procedure and deprive
the person attempting to utilize it of the benefits of its irrevocable con-
sent provisions. Even so, the act of surrender may nevertheless be effec-
tive to permit a valid adoption under different procedures.
Logic and sound policy demand that an act of surrender which fails
to comply fully with the requirements of section 422.3 should at least
be given the limited effect of investing the court with the discretion to
proceed with the adoption under section 429, if it is in the best interests
of the child to do so. In this manner, a defect in a section 422.3 act
of surrender would not automatically operate to terminate or nullify the
adoption proceedings. The defect would produce this result only if the
court concluded that it was not in the best interests of the child for the
adoption proceeding to continue. When the court treats the adoption as
having been brought under section 429, the execution of the notarial act
evidencing parental consent is, in itself, a sufficient surrender. Under sec-
tion 429 the natural parents may attempt to revoke their consent at any
time-they will not be absolutely barred from attempting to revoke their
consent by their failure to do so within a stipulated thirty-day period,
as they would have been in an adoption proceeding pursuant to a valid
section 422.3 act of surrender. The natural parents' withdrawal of con-
sent in the section 429 proceeding will not bar a decree of adoption,
however, unless the court concludes that it would be in the best interests
of the child.
This result is commendable. First, such a reading of the statute
recognizes that the overriding concern in any adoption proceeding is to
ensure that at all times the best interests of the child are protected.2 By
invoking the court's discretion to decide what is in the child's best in-
terests and by permitting a judge the discretion to allow a defective sec-
tion 422.3 act of surrender nevertheless to evidence consent for the pur-
62. The most important consideration in any adoption proceeding is whether the adop-
tion is in the best interests of the child, and the trial judge's finding as to best interests
is entitled to great weight. In re MDA, 427 So. 2d 1334 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). "Whether
an adoption is in the best interests of the child must be decided on the facts of each case
and the trial judge is vested with great discretion in making that determination." In re
BAS Applying for Adoption, 424 So. 2d 405, 407 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). It is not enough
to examine love and the home environment provided by the adoptive parent or parents,
but it is necessary as well to examine the depth and closeness of a child's ties with a non-
custodial natural parent or parents, and the effect which the loss of this relationship would
have on the child. In re Glass Applying for Adoption, 424 So. 2d 383, 388 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1982).
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poses of another method of adoption, this solution ensures that the child's
interests are considered in a regulated, objective proceeding.
It is apparent that the legislature, by providing a new and special
adoption procedure, intended that people be able to utilize section 422.3
and thus avail themselves of the advantages and safeguards found in that
method. However, the legislature established requirements that are so
stringent that consent will at times be rendered invalid by failure to com-
ply with the technicalities of the act of surrender. CDT is a typical case
of consent that is held invalid due to the failure to meet the requirements
of section 422.3.
The court in CDT expressly failed to reach the consideration of the
child's best interests. CDT was decided solely upon the basis of the in-
validity of the act of surrender. If section 422.3 had been intended as
an exclusive procedure, then such a finding of invalidity is in order. A
court would not have to consider a child's best interests if the threshold
concern of valid consent were lacking. However, such a strict construc-
tion defeats the legislative policy of encouraging adoptions, and such an
approach will have the real effect of deterring them.
It is not in the best interests of a child to disallow an adoption for
mere failure to meet technical requirements. As Judge Miller said in dis-
sent in Moreland v. Craft,3 "[tihere must be some line where the interest
of the child must bear more heavily than the right of a natural parent
to block an adoption.""' "It is inconceivable that the Legislature, in the
enactment of the adoption law, could have contemplated a breaking of
those bonds of affection as well as the wasting of the adoptive parents'
efforts, by reason of the unstable whims and fancies of the natural
parent-by the mere changing of his mind." 5 If any adverse consequences
must be suffered, it is preferable that they be endured by a mature adult
rather than a child, whose immaturity does not adequately equip it to
deal with psychological and emotional setbacks of this nature. The court
in CDT allowed the detriment to befall a child.
The child in CDT had been with her adoptive parents from the first
day following her birth, but the court's decision removed her from the
custody of her adoptive parents and returned her to her mother without
a consideration of her best interests.6 6
If the child involved in the instant case had been older, the factors
63. 244 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 348, 246 So. 2d 197 (1971).
64. Id. at 42 (Miller, J., dissenting).
65. Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 356-57, 31 So. 2d 819, 825 (1947) (Hamiter, J.,
dissenting).
66. The main aim of adoption should always be the maximization of the child's best
interests. See In re Hinton, 390 So. 2d 972, 975 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); In re Merril,
246 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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involved in consideration of the child's best interests would have been
more apparent. An older child would be more cognizant of the fact that
his "real" parents, with whom he has formed psychological and emo-
tional ties, are his adoptive parents.67 As a child whose interests are sup-
posed to be of primary importance in the adoption, he should have the
right to maintain his relationship with his adoptive parents. Preoccupa-
tion with biological ties should not make a child suffer the traumatic ex-
perience of separation from an environment that offers the child all the
things that adoption seeks to preserve: a happy home, stability, affec-
tion, adequate parental care, and a continuous relationship.68 It is detrimen-
tal to a child to sever a relationship with a psychological parent merely
in deference to the natural rights of a biological parent.69
Conclusion
The Private Adoption Act of 1979 does provide a procedure that will
allow adoptive parents to enter into an adoption proceeding without the
fear of revocation of parental consent. The authentic act of surrender
provides greater safeguards than any other method of private adoption.
To this extent, the use of this procedure by parents should be encour-
aged, but it should not be considered as a mandatory procedure to be
utilized by all parties attempting to adopt a child privately. To allege that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:422.3 is an exclusive procedure is to ignore
the policy considerations of the 1979 amendments. Such a narrow con-
struction of the statute will deter private adoptions, will invalidate adop-
tions due to failure to meet technical statutory requirements, and will not
serve the best interests of the child.
Under the better approach, the court in CDT, after determining that
the act of surrender was ineffective for purposes of the adoption pro-
cedure authorized by section 422.3, should have exercised its discretion
to consider the adoption as a section 429 adoption, requiring only a con-
sent evidenced in a notarial act. Thus, parties should always attempt to
utilize the section 422.3 procedure and avail themselves of its advantages,
but if this consent is rendered invalid due to some technicality, then the
67. In Judge Miller's dissent in Moreland, he distinguishes between natural parents and
"real" parents. 244 So. 2d at 42. In Moreland the adoptive parents had had the child for
three years and were the only "family" the child knew. However, the court recognized
the superior right of the natural parents. Recently, the trend has been toward recognizing
the interest of the adoptive parents. One writer has observed: "Now foster parents are often
given priority because they have formed strong emotional bonds with the child, and have
become the child's psychological parents." Katz, supra note 1, at 9.
68. See generally Comment, Termination of Parental Rights, supra note 10, at 550,
556-57. See also Harve, supra note 6.
69. J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 117 (1968); J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND BEST INTERESTS 122 (1973); Comment, Termination
of Parental Rights, supra note 10, at 558.
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adoption proceedings should be viewed as brought under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:429 and :432. This approach considers all circumstances and
situations and makes the child's best interests the determinative factor.
The court in CDT did not exercise its discretion to decide in the child's
best interests.70 To this extent at least, the decision in CDT represents
a decision contrary to the policy considerations inherent in the 1979 amend-
ments. The result will be to reduce rather than increase the number of
adoptions.
Amanda Karen Martin
70. For a discussion of the issue of best interests, see generally Chemerinsky, Defining
the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L.
79 (1979); Chambers, Adoption Without Consent, 13 Trial 29 (Oct. 1977).

